§1. Introduction
There has been a lively debate as of late concerning whether or not Kant 1 Since Kant explicitly says that judgments are composed out of concepts (cf., B322) and that inferences are composed out of judgments (cf., B359f), there has been no serious debate about whether their content is conceptual. Sensations have also been left to one side, as there have been persistent worries about whether or not Kant takes sensations to possess any content, or even any intentionality, at all, whether conceptual or otherwise (cf. George 1981) . The debate has primarily focused, therefore, on whether the distinction between concepts and 1 See, among other places, B376-77 and Jäsche Logic ('JL') §1 (9:91), §17 (9:101), and §41 (9:114). Throughout I will refer to Kant's works besides the first Critique by the standard convention of providing the Akademie Ausgabe (Kant 1902-) volume number and pagination. For the first Critique I will cite by B-edition pagination alone, save for cases where passages only appear in the A-edition. Where available, I have consulted, and usually followed, the translations in (Kant 1991-) , though I have silently modified them throughout.
intuitions in particular corresponds to a distinction in the kinds of contents of two sorts of representations.
2
Since these questions concern a distinction that lies at the very heart of Kant's system of theoretical philosophy (concepts vs. intuitions), sorting out their answers is of much more than 'merely' interpretive significance, as it will set much of the course for how we should understand the rest of Kant's project in the first Critique. And since Kant's distinction between intuitions and concepts has shaped, and continues to shape, much of the discussion in contemporary philosophy of perception and cognitive semantics (cf. Hanna however things might appear early on, Kant's strategy in the Transcendental Deduction and beyond shows he ultimately takes intuitions to involve concepts and to do so essentially (cf. Natorp 1910 , McDowell 1991b , McDowell 2009 , and Ginsborg 2008 . 3 The mistake of the non-conceptualist readers is, therefore, to take at face-value Kant's first passes over certain distinctions, and to fail to appreciate the extent to which Kant eventually either 'takes back' (Pippin 1989: 30) or 'corrects' (Natorp 1910: 276) what gives the initial impression that the 2 For an exception concerning sensations, see (Watkins 2008) . 3 See also (Sedgwick 1997) ; (Abela 2002) ; (Wenzel 2005) ; (Engstrom 2006) ; most recently, (Griffith 2010 Or are we asking instead whether Kant accepts that the way or manner in which intuitions represent their objects is distinct in kind from that of concepts? Or are we asking about something else altogether?
The near absence of discussion about the meaning of 'content' at issue is striking. 4 How are we to know what is under debate in the first place, prior to knowing the significance of such a central term?
5
My hope here is to advance this debate by explicitly focusing on only one of these specific meanings of 'content', and then asking whether Kant accepts that the content of intuitions (understood in this way) is distinct in kind from that of concepts. The sense of 'content' I will focus on is the third of those mentioned above -namely, an intuition's manner or way of representing its object. In other words, I will be focusing on something akin to 4 One partial exception is Hanna; cf., (Hanna 2008: 52-53) . I criticize Hanna's interpretation below in notes to §4 and §6. 5 Though, if Jeff Speaks is correct, in this respect, the interpretive debate about Kant might simply mirror a lack of consensus about what sense of 'content' is at issue in the broader debate about non-conceptual content in contemporary philosophy; cf. (Speaks 2005: §1 My main thesis in what follows will be that, at least with respect to 'content' understood in this way, Kant clearly accepts that the content of intuitions is non-conceptual.
Demonstrating this will require, first of all, that we find something that plays the role of object that a cognition involves, rather than the object itself.
With this alignment in mind, we can then better appreciate an important consequence of the familiar ways in which Kant repeatedly characterizes the difference between intuitions and concepts. As I remind us in §4, Kant famously claims that intuitions relate us to their objects immediately, in a way that depends on the presence and existence of their objects, a way that involves the object's 'appearance [Erscheinung]'. Concepts, by contrast, can relate us to objects only mediately, in a way that does not depend either on the presence or even the existence of their objects. Because intuitions representionally relate us to their objects in a way that is different in kind from the way that concepts do so (since intuitions allow objects themselves to 'appear' immediately), and because the relation in question just is the content at issue (in the sense of 'content' that we will be focusing on here), I conclude that that Kant would accept that the content of an intuition is nonconceptual.
Having presented the core of my positive argument for a non-conceptualist interpretation, I will then turn to the defense of my account against the series of textual and systematic considerations that conceptualist interpreters have taken to point in the opposite direction. In §5 I canvass what I see as the three most substantial challenges to nonconceptualist interpretations generally -challenges, therefore, that my own account must address, and challenges, moreover, that have not yet been properly dealt with by the previous non-conceptualist interpretations. These are (1) a set of claims in the Transcendental Deduction about 'the synthesis of apprehension in intuition' that might seem to suggest that conceptual synthesis must be involved in the very having of intuitions, (2) remarks about what the Transcendental Deduction is to accomplish, which might seem to suggest that its success rests upon showing the non-conceptualist thesis to be false, and (3) a series of passages that can appear to suggest that the involvement of concepts is necessary for a representation to have any relation to an object whatsoever.
In §6 I will argue that we can defuse the force of all of these challenges by sense (e.g., the presentation of the planet as morning star and evening star).
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One of Frege's chief motivations for making this further distinction was his reflection on informative statements of identity. Because we can recognize an object when it is presented in one way, but fail to recognize the very same object when it is presented in another way, we can learn something by assertions expressed by sentences of the form: 'A = 6 Though the seeds for further distinctions were already present in his discussion of what is involved in judgments of identity; compare (Kremer 2010: 220 and 236-40) . 7 See especially (Frege 1984: 157f) ; compare (Kremer 2010: 257) .
B', because we can learn that it is the same thing x that is being presented in two different ways (via the sense associated with 'A' and the sense associated with 'B'). If the only thing we allowed to function as the content of an expression were the item to which it referred (i.e., object x itself), then we would not be able to make sense of how statements like 'The morning star is identical to the evening star' could be informative when we are already familiar with relevant object (here: the planet) by way of one of these ways of its being presented.
8
What the notion of sense allows us to keep track of, therefore, are not differences at the level of the objects of our discourse and thought but differences in the ways of being given or presented with these objects. Frege takes this to imply, first, that objects (and references more generally) form no proper 'part' of what is contained 'in' the senses through which they are given or presented to us. 9 Frege takes this to imply, secondly, that it is this way of being given an object -and hence, a sense -that is directly 'grasped [erfaßt]' in mental acts like thinking and judging, rather than its reference (Frege 1984: 355-56) . In other words, senses, rather than referents, are the 'immediate object' of mental acts such as thinking, despite the fact that this immediate object is itself a representational relation to something else, a 'mode of being given' some further object (the reference).
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Now, Frege himself uses the distinction between sense and reference primarily in the analysis of our discourse about the abstract objects of logic and arithmetic. Even so, those writing under the influence of Frege's theory of content have readily extended the analysis to comprise both references that are concrete objects as well as ways of being given or presented with concrete objects that concern perception rather than thought (cf. McDowell 8 For references and further discussion, see (Kremer 2010: 253-58) . 9 See his November 13, 1904 letter to Russell (Frege 1980: 163) . 10 For the description of thoughts in this context as the 'objects' of acts of thinking, compare (Dummett 1997: 242-43 To be sure, to remain broadly Fregean, even cases like this, in which the sense at issue is object-dependent, will still nevertheless not be cases of object-involving or objectcontaining senses, since, for a Fregean, the object (referent) itself is never a part ('constituent') of the sense. 13 Nevertheless, due to its special relation to its reference, such a sense will be different in kind both from those grasped in purely conceptual reasoning as well as those grasped in fictional discourse.
11 See also Frege's discussion in his correspondence with Philip Jourdain of the senses associated with perceiving the same mountain from two directions; cf. (Frege 1980: 78-80) . 12 As McDowell puts it, our grasp of these senses 'depends essentially on the perceived presence of the objects' (McDowell 1984: 219) , such that this sort of 'mode of presentation is not capturable in a specification that someone could understand without exploiting the perceived presence of the [object] itself ' (McDowell 1991a: 266) . This is not to deny that we could still refer to these perceptual senses in thought, without 'grasping' them immediately. Referring to a sense, however, is different than grasping it. Recognition of this difference is key to recognizing that Frege's own account of sense does not entail that he is a 'descriptivist' about senses, despite the influential way that his views have been portrayed by Saul Kripke and John Searle; compare (McDowell 1986: 233-34) and (McDowell 1991a: 268-69 Here Kant claims explicitly that inner and outer intuition do not 'contain' the object they are representing or anything that is 'internal' to it. Instead, they have as their content the distinctive 'relation' between a subject and some object.
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This account of the contents of intuitions receives further support once we incorporate Kant's doctrine of appearances into our analysis. For Kant, the particular way that an intuition representationally 'relates' us to its object consists the intuition's allowing that object to 'appear [erscheinen]' to us. What is striking, for our purposes, is that he also identifies the appearance itself with what is 'contained' in an intuition:
The predicates of appearance can be attributed to the object itself in relation [Verhältniß] to our sense, e.g., the red color or fragrance to the rose… […] What is not to be encountered in the object in itself at all, but is always to be encountered in its relation to the subject and is inseparable from the representation of the object, is appearance. (B69-70fn; my ital.)
The representation of a body in intuition…contains [enthält] nothing at all that could pertain to an object in itself, but merely the appearance of something and the way [Art] in which we are affected by it. (B61; my ital.) 18 Rather than the appearing object itself being 'contained in' the intuition, the intuition instead contains only the way this object appears, i.e., the appearance-relation.
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Keeping in mind the fact that an appearance itself is a relation (i.e., one of appearing and ( (or 'given' through) the sense grasped. An appearance would seem to be the 'object' of an intuition only in the same way that, for Frege, when we grasp a thought in an act of thinking, the thought itself might be described as the 'immediate object' of the thinking. 21 This is so, despite the fact that, on Frege's account as well, what is being grasped in this act is a relation to something else, a 'mode of being given' some further object. Similarly for Kant: in virtue of being what is 'grasped' in an intuition, an appearance can be considered as the immediate object of the intuiting. Yet in grasping this appearance, we are thereby representationally related to some further object (a 'something = X'). Appearances, therefore, function as the 'contents' of intuitions, in Kant's own sense of the term.
22 21 For the description of thoughts in this context as the 'objects' of acts of thinking, compare (Dummett 1997: 242-43) . 22 This point often overlooked, because of Kant's frequent description of appearances as 'objects' of the senses. Even so, appearances are not the ultimate intentional objects of intuitions, but are instead the ways in which these objects are given. This helps bring out the way in which appearances are not the Brentanian 'Inhalt' of an intuition, as is suggested by (Vaihinger 1892: 34) , among others; for some discussion, see (Aquila 2003) . For an interpretation that is closer my own here, compare Rohs: 'intuitions are not purely qualitative feelings, nor are they mere sense-impressions; rather, they are directed immediately to objects only as the having [Haben] of a singular sense', where it is implied that Rohs means something like Frege's 'sense' (Rohs 2001: 224; cf. 217f) . Michael Dummett has used this analogy in the opposite direction, to help explain Frege's notion of sense by appeal to Kant's conception of intuition; cf. (Dummett 2001: 13) and (Dummett 1997: 242-43) .
§4. The non-conceptuality of the content of intuitions
In the previous section, I argued that Kant accepts that cognitions in general, and intuitions in particular, incorporate something along the lines of Fregean 'sense'. In addition to the object to which we are related in a cognition, each cognition also has a particular way of being representationally related to this object. I argued, furthermore, that this relation (rather than the object) is what Kant calls the 'content' of a cognition. I suggested, finally, that what serves as the content of an intuition in particular is the appearance of an object, since Kant aligns this appearance itself with the distinctive representational relation that the subject comes to bear to some object ('= X') in the act of intuiting.
Now, there is, of course, much more that would need to be said, both about intuitions, and especially about the appearance-relation they contain, for the account we are developing to be comprehensive. Nevertheless, we have enough on the that an intuition has a content -indeed, in Kant's own sense of this term -that is distinct in kind from the content of concepts.
Kant's commitment to the non-conceptuality of the content of our intuitions becomes even more evident once we unpack two key aspects in terms of which Kant cashes out the distinctive immediacy of our intuitions' representational relations to their object.
The first aspect is that our intuitions entail the existence of their objects. In our case, at least, intuiting therefore requires being affected by the presence of an existing object upon our sensibility, which in turn yields an appearance of the object. This makes both the act of intuiting and the appearance that is its content 'object-dependent '. 24 This is so, even if the appearance is not object-involving, since it does not 'contain' the intentional object to which the appearance ultimately relates us.
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The content of a concept, by contrast, is something that Kant thinks is not uniformly dependent upon either the existence of its object or its presence to the mind. Hanna (2005: 257f ) also points to 'immediacy' and 'object-dependence' as essential features of intuitions, but then takes this to show that intuitions have a 'referential directedness' that is independent not only of 'any sort of descriptive content' but also of 'any other sort of representational content' (Hanna 2005: 258; my ital.) . I agree that intuitions enjoy the former sort of independence, but fail to see why we should think they do not have any representational content. For all their immediacy, intuitions are, after all, still kinds of representations. Moreover, since two different intuitions can be equally immediately 'of' the same object and equally dependent on that same object without being identical -since, e.g., they each provide glimpses of an object represented from a different point in space -we have reason for carving out a distinct content-dimension for intuitions as well, something on the order of what Rohs calls 'a singular sense' (Rohs 2001: 217) . If not, then it would be hard to block the conclusion drawn by Marcus Willaschek that while intuitions per se are dependent on the existence and presence of their objects, this implies only that they relate to objects in a causal, but not intentional, manner (cf. Willaschek 1997: 546f and 560). It is therefore not clear what 'content' Hanna himself thinks that intuitions could still possess, once he has rejected all 'representational content'. Hanna seems to reject the idea that intuitions could possess content in the Fregean sense of the term, but appears to do so only because he wrongly associates Frege's conception of content-as-sense exclusively with descriptivism (cf., Hanna 2011: 352) . 25 As we have seen, Kant thinks that an intuition 'contains nothing at all that could pertain to an object in itself' (B61; my ital.). For this reason, I think Allais goes too far in (Allais 2007) when she tries to portray Kant as being committed to a 'direct or non-representative theory of perception' (Allais 2007: 464) , one which does not involve any 'mental intermediaries' but which is closer to a form of direct realism that nowadays gets called 'austere relationalism' and is associated with John Campbell and Charles Travis, according to which the object itself is a 'constituent' of the intuition (Allais 2007: 468 it can do so with respect to the pure concepts that arise from the nature of understanding itself (B75; cf. B93). For our purposes, we can even grant that the differences in quantity of object and metaphysical origin might well be equally fundamental marks of the difference between the two kinds of cognitions. What is crucial for our purposes is simply that, in addition to these further differences, Kant also takes there to be a distinction in kind between the nature of their contents.
It is arguable, however, that the difference in content is not only as fundamental, for
Kant, as either the difference in quantity of object or the metaphysical difference in origination, but is perhaps even more basic. 27 Furthermore, it is the difference in content, rather than the other differences, that would seem to be ultimately decisive in Kant's 27 For one thing, Kant seems to allow that certain concepts also necessarily pick out ('determine') an individual, if they pick out anything at all. The foremost example of this is the pure concept of God or the 'ideal', which Kant claims explicitly is 'the representation of an individual', despite being a concept (B604). For another, Kant explicitly allows for there to be a 'singular use' of any concept we like, in judgments like 'this house is red' (cf., VL 24:908-9; see also JL §1n2 (9:91) and §11n (9:97)). For further discussion, see (Parsons 1992: 64f) . Both of these suggest that an appeal to the so-called 'singularity criterion' will not be sufficient to distinguish conceptual representations from intuitions. Other considerations point against taking the spontaneity/passivity contrast to be sufficient either. Kant accepts that the aforementioned 'originary [ursprüngliche] ' representation that the divine mind would enjoy of its objects would be both an intuition and yet not passive (cf., B71-72). This speaks against approaches, such as McDowell's, that depend on the 'appeal to the distinct passivity' of intuition, over and against the 'exercises of spontaneity' in 'acts of thinking and judging', to capture all that is necessary to underwrite the distinction between the two kinds of acts (cf., McDowell 1991b: 26-29) . Of course, as a conceptualist, McDowell cannot place the difference between representations in their content; to the contrary, he insists that both kinds of acts involve one and the same 'thinkable content'.
Engstrom, by contrast, concedes that the distinction between spontaneity and receptivity appears to be introduced by Kant to capture the fact that, in the case of minds like ours, the difference in the source of our representations is correlative with a 'difference in source in respect of their content' (Engstrom 2006: 5; cf., 19 ). Engstrom does not explain what he means by 'content' here, but it emerges that he at least means for the 'content' of a representation to be something like a 'matter' which requires some 'form', only in combination with which can any representation be achieved. Engstrom then argues that, in the case of intuitions, this form must be something supplied by spontaneity itself (cf., Engstrom 2006: 18f) . This implies that, for Engstrom, while receptivity does supply a distinct kind of 'content', it is not self-sufficient to supply a distinct kind of representation that includes this content, since it cannot, from itself, give this content any form. I return to Engstrom's analysis below, in §5.3, and then criticize it in §6.3. rejection of the rationalist's account of the nature of our cognition in mathematics. Kant famously holds that the fundamental truths of arithmetic and geometry cannot be known through the analysis of the relevant concepts, but requires 'hurrying immediately to intuition' (B743). Part of Kant's point here is, of course, that we cannot know the truth of certain judgments simply on the basis of such analysis, but the deeper point is that we cannot even know what is meant by certain terms in mathematics except for our familiarity with the ways objects are given in intuition -i.e., familiarity with the contents distinctive of our intuitions.
This would seem to be true of the terms 'space' and 'time' themselves (cf. B39 and B47-48),
as well as what it means to be 'oriented' within such frameworks (cf., 8:134-35 and Prolegomena §13 4:285-86; see Hanna 2008: 53f) . This intuition-dependence is further confirmed by Kant's account of the logical structure of conceptual contents themselves, since these simply do not allow for mathematical relations to objects to be represented ('constructed') through concepts alone (cf. systematic, challenge concerns the crucial role that this thesis of the necessary dependence of intuitions on concepts is thought to play in the Transcendental Deduction. The third concerns the semantics of intuitions more directly, as it consists in an argument that concepts must be involved for intuitions to enjoy any representational relation to objects whatsoever.
In this section I will present the core of these challenges; in the next section ( §6) I will show how they can be overcome. This will also let me further differentiate my own account from previous non-conceptualist interpretations.
The ontology of intuitions.
Conceptualist interpreters place a considerable amount of weight on certain claims in both versions of the Transcendental Deduction that seem to suggest that Kant thinks that the very having of intuitions is not possible, but for certain acts of synthesis or 'combination [Verbindung] '. This is taken to point toward conceptualism about intuitions because Kant claims explicitly that 'all combination is an action of the understanding' (B130; my ital.; cf., B134-35). Insofar as the understanding itself is defined by Kant to be primarily the capacity for thinking, understood as 'cognition through concepts' (B94), its combination would seem to involve concepts as well -at least the pure concepts or categories (cf., B105). If intuiting necessarily involved such combination, it would be constituted, in part, by concepts, and then the candidate 'vehicle' of the nonconceptual content would be shown to be a vehicle for conceptual content after all (cf. Every intuition contains a manifold in itself….
[…] Now in order for unity to come from this manifold…, first the running through [Durchlaufen] and then the taking together [Zusammennehmung] of this manifold is necessary, which action I call the synthesis of apprehension, since it is aimed directly at the intuition, which, to be sure, provides a manifold, but which can never effect this as such, and indeed as contained in one representation, without the occurrence of such a synthesis. (A99)
Here Kant can seem to be claiming that, in order to have an intuition -i.e., in order to have something that has the unity that a single intuition has -a synthesis is required.
Kant's description of this same synthesis in §26 of the B-Deduction can seem to make all the more evident his commitment to the dependence of our having an intuition upon this synthesis -and, dependence, in particular, upon the involvement of the pure concepts or categories. 28 And if we add to these passages Kant's often-cited claim from the Leitfaden that it is 'the pure concept of understanding' that both 'gives unity to the different representations in a judgment' but also 'gives unity to the mere synthesis of different representations in an intuition' (B105), Kant's commitment to the involvement of concepts in the having of intuitions might seem to be demonstrated beyond doubt. The conclusion Kant is aiming at in the Deduction is often taken to be expressed in §26 of the B-edition:
The Transcendental
[E]verything that may ever come before our senses must stand under the laws that arise apriori from the understanding alone. As the conceptualist interpreters see it, in order to reach this conclusion, Kant's strategy is to
show that the very 'unity' of what is given through the senses -i.e., the unity of an intuition itself -is something for which the understanding is responsible via the synthesis of apprehension. Indeed, they urge, it is precisely this that is the larger point of the claims about apprehension presented above. It is only because Kant can show that the very being, as it were, of an intuition is constituted by understanding -so the argument goes -that he can remove the worry that the understanding's concepts might not be valid of what is given in intuition, i.e., that appearances might not 'stand under' the categories.
If, by contrast, the non-conceptualist were right to think that Kant's considered view was instead that concepts are not involved in the very having of intuitions -i.e., if Kant really thought that it is not of the essence of intuitions and appearances themselves to involve (and 'depend on') concepts -then Kant could not conclude apriori that they do and must 'stand under' the categories. In effect, the second objection is that, if the first objection fails, then so too must the Deduction itself. If the non-conceptualist interpretation is correct, then
Kant's strategy in the Transcendental Deduction is hopelessly confused.
The semantics of intuitions.
The third challenge is perhaps the most direct one, as it specifically targets the nature of the content of intuitions. This arises from texts that seem to suggest that, regardless of whether Kant thinks that concepts must be involved for intuitions to be had or not, Kant thinks that intuitions -indeed, representations of any sort -do not acquire any 'relation to an object' at all until synthesis through concepts has given them such a relation. Since, on my account, the particular representational relation to an object that a representation bears just is its content, this would imply that a representation simply does not have any content -really, any intentionality -until concepts become involved and introduce the requisite relation. This third challenge, therefore, poses the following dilemma: either intuitions without concepts simply do not have a content in the relevant sense -they are 'empty', as it were -or, if it is constitutive of intuitions to have a content (as it seems to be), then intuitions themselves, and their contents, must be constituted by concepts (cf. Willaschek 1997: 560; Griffith 2010: §5, 9 and §10.4, 22; and Engstrom 2006: 18-19) .
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This theme is also one that is thought to flow throughout both versions of the Deduction. In the A-Deduction, for example, when Kant asks: 'what does it mean if one speaks of an object corresponding to and therefore also distinct from the cognition?', he answers as follows:
[O]ur thought of the relation [Beziehung] of all cognition to its object carries something of necessity with it…since insofar as they are to relate to an object, our cognitions must also necessarily agree with each other in their relation to it, i.e., they must have that unity that constitutes the concept of an object. (A104-5; my ital.)
This might be taken to imply that the very having of a relation to an object is something that requires that 'the concept of an object' be involved in a given cognition.
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A similar claim can seem to be found in the B-Deduction as well. In §17, for example, Kant writes as if 'an object' just is 'that in the concept of which the manifold of a given intuition is united' (B137; my ital.). He then goes on to claim that 'the unity of consciousness' that pertains to such 'uniting' according to a concept is ultimately 'that which alone constitutes [ausmacht] the relation of representations to an object' (B137; my ital.). And still other texts from the first Critique might be taken to point toward a similar conclusion (cf.
B242-44, A250, B304, and 11:52).
29 For earlier versions of this thesis, see (Kemp Smith 1918: 222) ; (Sellars 1968: I, §59, 23) ; and (Pippin 1982: 33) . Similar interpretations are provided in (Prauss 1971) and (Dickerson 2005) , both of whom see intuition per se as providing only something which must be given an 'interpretation [Deutung]' by our understanding if it is to represent any object (Prauss) , something which supplies only a 'medium in which' we can 'see' or 'picture' objects thanks to acts of understanding (Dickerson) . 30 Kant seems to say as much shortly thereafter, writing that the 'relation to an object' is 'is nothing other than the necessary unity of consciousness, thus also of the synthesis of the manifold through a common function of the mind for combining [verbinden] it in one representation' (A109; my ital.). Kant's thesis can seem to be that the very 'relation' of a cognition to its object is constituted ('provided') by the unity of a synthesis or combination, according to a 'common function', i.e., a pure concept.
§6. Replies to objections
Let me now reply to each of these objections in turn.
6.1. Before we look again at the particular texts at issue in §5.1, the first thing to note is that even if conceptualist interpreters are right in their claim that Kant thinks that synthesis and concepts are essentially involved in every intuition, this would not, by itself, necessarily show that Kant must think that the content of intuitions is thereby conceptual. 31 At the very least, determining how exactly this first objection supports the conceptualist interpretation will have to wait until more is said about how they mean for 'content' to be understood in these circumstances.
For the sake of argument, however, let us assume that there is a valid inference somewhere nearabouts. At this point, the most common strategy adopted by nonconceptualist interpreters so far has been to try to find a way to break the link between synthesis, on the one hand, and understanding and concepts, on the other. 32 As their critics have been quick to point out, however, this strategy faces a straightforwardly uphill battle if it hopes to ever accommodate the sequence of texts we have cited above (cf. Ginsborg 2008: 31 For one thing, it is at least conceivable that concepts could be involved in representations in ways that do not fully or completely transform their content into something that is thorough-goingly conceptual -into something, that is, that has no non-conceptual remainder. Perhaps concepts can serve to unify various nonconceptual contents without thereby rendering these contents conceptual at all. Perhaps the content of socalled 'demonstrative concepts' (like this-such) are at least not completely conceptual in nature, but something more of a hybrid. (Compare (Hanna 2008: 56f) and (Peacocke 2001: 244f) .) Note that even Sellars -who is the interpreter most responsible for introducing the form 'this-such' into the analysis of Kant's doctrine of intuitions -concedes that what he means to express by the word replacing 'such' in 'this-such' (e.g., 'cube' in 'this-cube') is not what this word typically expresses, because it is not meant to express anything general: 'in the representation: this-cube, cube is not occurring as a general at all. The hyphenated phrase 'this-cube' expresses a representing of something as a cube in a way that is conceptually prior to cube as a general or universal representation' (Sellars 1968: I. §15, 6-7) . 32 Allais, for example, tries to find room for a distinction between 'synthesizing that is conceptualizing' and synthesizing that is not, in order to allow for synthesis to be necessary for intuition but to block the implication that intuitions are concept-involving after all (cf., Allais 2009: 395-6 and 406-7) . Like Allais, Rohs takes the synthesis of apprehension mentioned above to be just such a 'non-conceptual' synthesis (see Rohs 2001: 220-21l; cf., Allais 2009: 396) . In a similar fashion, while Hanna, too, concedes, that intuition must involve a kind of synthesis, he insists that it is one that is brought about by a 'lower-level spontaneity' possessed by the imagination, independently of the understanding, which in turn makes the relevant acts of synthesis distinct in kind from those that pertain to the understanding (2008: 62).
68f; and Griffith 2010: §10.2, 19f) . In particular, it is hard to see how this sort of approach will ever be able to square with Kant's explicit claim (cited above) that 'all combination' is an act of understanding. 33 These passages, and others besides, seem to stifle any hope for carving out space for a kind of synthesis that does not involve concepts. We would do well, therefore, to look for another way around this objection.
Such an alternate route opens up if we take a closer look at the passages cited above in §5.1. What a closer look reveals is not that Kant thinks that intuitions involve some nonconceptual synthesis, but rather he thinks they do not involve any synthesis at all -contrary to the way these passages have been read by the partisans on both sides of this debate. What is at issue in these passages, for Kant, is not what is required for the mere having of an intuition, but rather what is involved in the reflective representing of an intuition as being constituted in a certain way, as providing us with a certain determinate relation to an object.
We can begin to see that it is the representation of intuitions, and not intuitions themselves (per se), that is Kant's true topic in these passages by first filling in a key ellipse from the A-Deduction quote above:
Every intuition contains a manifold in itself, which however would not be represented as such [my ital.] if the mind did not distinguish [unterschiede] the time in the succession of impressions on one another; for as contained in one moment, no representation can ever by anything other than absolute unity. (A99) Here Kant signals that he means for there to be a clear distinction between (a) an intuition's being a unity, and containing a manifold, and (b) that intuition being represented as a unity, or being represented as containing a manifold. Kant also makes clear that the former two features of an intuition (being a unity, containing a manifold) belong to it per se, prior to and independent of any further acts of mind. That some unity pertains to an intuition per se follows from 33 At several points Kant even asserts that the spontaneity of imagination is 'one and the same with' that of understanding (cf., B162n), which would seem to block the escape-route we saw Hanna float above.
Kant's claim that a single intuition 'as contained in one moment' has 'an absolute unity' (A99; my ital.). What is more, Kant's use of 'absolute' here points to the fact that this unity is one that has no further ground whatsoever, let alone one in any act of synthesis. 34 That containing a manifold also pertains to an intuition per se follows from Kant's claim that this manifold is already there to be 'distinguished by the mind' and subsequently 'represented as manifold', prior to these acts actually coming about.
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With this distinction in mind, it also becomes quite clear which unity it is that Kant is taking to be dependent on the 'synthesis of apprehension in intuition', in the remainder of the passage at A99: it is precisely the unity that 'comes from' the manifold by the manifold 'being run through' and 'taken together', due to a synthesis that is 'aimed at the intuition' -i.e., our (b) above and not our (a), not the 'absolute unity' that already pertains to the intuition simply as 'providing the manifold'. Kant's point here is thus that the synthesis of apprehension is required only if we wish to 'apprehend' an intuition as containing a particular, determinate manifold -that is, only if we wish to represent a particular manifold as 'contained in one representation'. It is not that such synthesis is required for the mere having of the intuition in the first place, or the mere having of a representation that does in 34 Note that Kant's claim here is that it is a manifold that has an absolute unity 'in one moment', and not that this absolute unity is 'simple' (or 'atomic'). If Kant had claimed the latter -as Paton, for example, seems to think (cf., Paton 1936: I.358) -then it would be hard to make sense of the idea that there could be further acts of 'distinguishing' and 'running through' what is given in this moment. The significance of this earlier 'absolute unity' in sense, something present pre-'apprehension', is something that has been overlooked by most of Kant's interpreters, not just the conceptualists. Both Paton and Kemp Smith rightly distinguish the synthesis of apprehension from what is responsible for 'yielding the manifold' in the first place (cf., Kemp Smith 1918: 226f; Paton 1936: I.347) , something that both think we should attribute to what Kant calls the 'synopsis of the manifold apriori through sense', at the outset of the A-Deduction (A94) -though neither properly connects the synopsis with Kant's claim that that it is not just a manifold that is provided prior to apprehension, but one that is given in 'absolute unity'. (Indeed, Paton explicitly rejects this connection.) A more careful analysis of this point can be found in (Allison 2004: 113-14) . 35 A related distinction is present at A97, where Kant distinguishes the 'synopsis' of sense, which is what characterizes sense insofar as 'it contains a manifold in its intuition', from the 'synthesis' that 'corresponds to this', the first component of which is the synthesis of 'apprehension of the representations as modifications of the mind in intuition' (my ital.). The synthesis of apprehension 'corresponds' to the synopsis in that it takes what is provided by the synopsis as its object, in order to run through and represent it as a manifold of modifications of mind of a certain sort. The original belonging-together of a manifold, by being contained in an intuition, however, is something that is present prior to this synthesis. fact contain a manifold. In other words, while the synthesis of apprehension 'in intuition' is surely a synthesis that is 'aimed at intuition', it is not at all one that makes up or puts together an intuition, or puts something 'in' intuition, in the first place.
The very same distinction can be found in the B-Deduction. Kant here also distinguishes 'the manifold of representations' that 'can be given in an intuition', on the one hand, from, on the other hand, 'the combination of the manifold in general' as something that 'can never come to us through the senses' (B129). Kant goes on to clarify, however, that what he means to be designating by 'combination' or 'synthesis', as 'an act of understanding', concerns again our ability to 'represent something as combined [als verbunden vorstellen]' (B130; my ital.).
36 But then, just as in the A-Deduction, Kant need not be seen as claiming here that synthesis or combination by our understanding is necessary for us to have representations that are unities of a manifold. Rather, synthesis is only necessary for us to consciously represent ('apprehend') these representations as unities, as giving us something that contains a manifold, as containing this or that determinate manifold that is unified in this particular way rather than that.
As Kant frames the issue in §17, what he is concerned with here are the conditions under which intuitions must stand 'in order to become an object for me' (B138; my ital.) -i.e., in order for the intuitions themselves (and their content (appearances)) to become the objects of further representations. This becoming an object of some further representation, however, is a concern distinct from the conditions that intuitions must meet in order to themselves already represent or relate to an object. The kind of representation at issue here in the B-Deduction is therefore something that is distinct from any intuition itself; it is, rather, something over and above intuitions, since it is a representation that has an intuition (or several) as its object.
This is made explicit again in §26, where Kant contrasts the mere having of an intuition with a separate 'empirical consciousness' of the intuition itself, something he calls 'perception'. What is more, Kant here also explicitly describes the 'synthesis of apprehension'
as that through which this special kind of awareness of a manifold becomes possible: this synthesis is that 'through which perception, i.e., the empirical consciousness of terminological distinction is recognized, we can see that it does not follow from any of Kant's remarks about apprehension 'in intuition' (as that which yields perception) that such activity is also required for the mere having of an intuition per se, or the being given an appearance per se.
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In fact, once we are sensitive to Kant's intention to draw a distinction between intuition (appearance) and perception as the 'apprehension' of an intuition in a further representation, it becomes apparent that this is a distinction that Kant returns to again and 40 Here is the place to take up a further iteration of this objection, according to which the Deduction allegedly asserts a necessary role for the pure concepts to play already in the pure intuitions of space and time, with the key passages being A99, A102, B136n, and B160-61. Again, a closer look shows Kant's topic to be what is necessarily involved in the formation of the concepts of space and time, on the basis of these intuitions, not the conditions for the original intuitions of space and time per se. At A107, for example, Kant explicitly identifies the 'concepts' of space and time as what is at issue, noting, moreover, that these concepts are what arise when intuitions are put in relation to transcendental apperception (understanding), which presupposes that these intuitions are already there in the first place. A similar distinction seems to be implicit at B160n-61n, though (as many have noted) the text of this footnote is extraordinarily dense. At the very least, more would need to be shown that, despite the explicit mention of 'concepts' of space and time, these texts must be read as making claims about the conditions of pure intuitions (rather, say, than conditions of their 'apprehension').
intuiting itself requires anything more than the conscious 'living through', as it were, of a case of being immediately related to some object. The main strategy of the conceptualist interpreter has been to claim that Kant cannot really be asserting here what he otherwise seems to be clearly asserting. 43 My interpretation, 43 For the reply that Kant cannot mean what he says in these sections preceding the Deduction, but instead means to introduce only a merely apparent difficulty, something 'counterfactual', see (Ginsborg 2008: 70f) and (Griffith 2010: §4, 7) ; in this Ginsborg and Griffith are anticipated by Paton (cf., 1936: I.324n3 ). As Allais has already argued convincingly, however (cf., 2009: 387n13), on grammatical grounds alone it is very difficult to maintain such a counterfactual reading of the passages I have cited above (unlike others in the neighborhood, e.g., at B123). Here I try to further the case for taking Kant at his word in these passages by focusing our attention on a distinction (intuition vs. perception and experience) that is at issue in them but that Allais does not herself discuss.
by contrast, provides us with sufficient textual and systematic support to allow us to take Kant's claims at face-value. It also allows for the same straightforward approach to the many other passages that also assert the independence of intuitions and appearances from the involvement of concepts (e.g., an intuition is a representation that 'can precede any act of thinking' (B67) and 'can be given prior to all thinking' (B132)). The same thought arises in the B-Deduction. In §17 Kant describes our understanding as the faculty for the 'determinate relation of given representations to an object' (B137; my ital.). In fact, Kant introduces the concept of an object, as 'that in the concept of which the manifold of a given intuition is united' (B137), precisely in order to spell out what is required in order make the relation that is contained in a given representation a 'determinate' relation for our consciousness. The particular way in which the given manifold is 'united' in a concept is therefore what determines, for consciousness, what is given in intuition as something related to this object rather than that one. This act does not, however, institute this relation itself; rather, it makes us reflectively aware of the relation (makes the relation 'determinate' for consciousness). And Kant returns to this same point throughout the first Critique and in other writings.
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Hence, while understanding is necessary for the transformation of our consciousness of an object by its appearance in an intuition into a consciousness of that object as one that is appearing in this and other appearances -i.e., a consciousness of this object as an object of experience -no such act is necessary for intuiting itself. It is only the constitution of experience out of intuitions, through the comparison and synthesis of appearances with one 45 Compare A111, B125-26, B242, B314, and Kant's unsent reply to a 1791 letter from J.S. Beck (11:310-11). Throughout Kant's concern is distinguish how a given representation, simply as representation, 'has' an object to which it is related from what is required for us to take ('determine') what already relates us to an object as so related, to 'posit', 'ascribe', or 'think' an object for the appearance.
With the distinction between intuition, perception, and experience in mind, it is worth emphasizing the need to rethink what is at issue in the passages from the Second Analogy often cited as evidence for conceptualism (furnished in a footnote above in §5.3). As one might now expect, in the Analogies 'of Experience', Kant's topic is how 'perceptions' come to be unified in the kind of 'connection [Verknüpfung] ' that constitutes 'experience' (B218). Since the 'perception' at issue is that of an empirical consciousness (apprehension) of an intuition, and not the simple having of the intuition per se, and since 'experience' itself is something that necessarily 'contains the concept of an object that is given in intuition or appears' (B126), Kant's primary topic in the Analogy (how we represent objects in experience) is actually two steps removed from the conditions on intuiting.
another in reflection, that requires acts of understanding and hence concepts, not the intuiting itself. 46 To be sure, without such acts of understanding, 'without concepts', Kant clearly thinks that we are, in an important sense, 'blind' as to what it is that we are intuiting, as the oft-cited passage has it (B75). Its crucial corollary, however, is that the absence of either these synthetic acts or the resulting 'empirical consciousness' need not remove or eliminate the original content of the intuition itself (cf. Hanna 2005: 257) . Not only Kant does not claim that intuitions without concepts become 'nothing' at all, he does not even claim that become 'empty' or without content, which is what we would expect, were the conceptualist interpretation to be true. Rather, Kant says of such cases that we are 'blind' because we are not conscious of something that is there -namely, the particular features of the relation to an object that we already enjoy in the intuition. In the mere having of an intuition, we are simply conscious of some object by way of grasping its appearance. We are not, however, also conscious of this appearance-relation itself. For this latter sort of reflective consciousness, a further representation is required, one in which we no longer simply live through the intuiting but instead take it as an object of consciousness in its own right. 47 that Kant accepts non-conceptual content. This is because Kant accepts that intuitions put us in a representational relation to objects that is distinct in kind from the relation that pertains to concepts. I argued, furthermore, that this is the meaning that Kant himself assigns to the term 'content'. We should conclude, then, that Kant himself could assert, in his own voice, that intuitions have a non-conceptual content.
In the later parts, I then set out to defuse what I take to be the three most pressing objections from the side of the conceptualist interpreters. I hope to have shown that while the conceptualists have picked up on a genuinely persistent theme in the texts they marshal in their defense, they have done so at the neglect of another theme that is equally present in these same texts. Conceptualists are surely right to emphasize that Kant thinks that intuition without synthesis cannot give us a certain kind of consciousness (perception, experience) of the relation to an object that an intuition provides. As we have seen, without such synthesis (in reflection), we are 'blind' to the content of the intuition, in the sense that it will not be grasped 'as appearance', let alone as the appearance of any particular object. Conceptualists are wrong, however, to infer from this that Kant also thinks that intuition on its own cannot already put us into some immediate representational relation through which we are thereby conscious of an object. All of the passages they point to are not only compatible with, but are even often suggestive of, the contrary interpretation, according to which intuitions do possess an independent, non-conceptual content. Now, even if I have succeeded on both the positive and defensive fronts, the account I have developed here is, of course, provisional in many respects, as must be any brief discussion of the nature of appearances or of the Deduction. What is more, because Kant's accounts of intuition and appearance lie at the very heart of his transcendental idealism as a whole, there is good reason to think that the complete resolution of the present
